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WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW: ACT 796 OF 1993 AND THE
DEFINITION OF "COMPENSABLE INJURY"
Terry D. Lucy*
I. INTRODUCTION
Act 796 of 1993,' which vastly altered the landscape of workers'
compensation law in Arkansas, has always meant different things to different
people. Shortly after its passage, proponents of business hailed the Act as the
answer to a crisis, while advocates for labor described it as a "devastating
blow" that sought to reduce workers' compensation costs by simply excluding
large categories of injured workers from coverage.2 Even those in relatively
neutral comers asked whether the Act had gone too far.3
Partisian feelings are just as strong nearly five years later, but the Act has
endured two legislative sessions with essentially no substantive changes. In
other words, love it or hate it, Act 796 is the law and appears to have a certain
amount of staying power. The issue of the Act's overall propriety is thus
secondary to the question of how it has been interpreted and applied by
Arkansas's Workers' Compensation Commission and appellate courts over the
past few years. Accordingly, this article will examine some of the more
significant cases which have addressed the various requirements of proving a
"compensable injury" within the meaning of Arkansas Code section 11-9-
102(5)-the heart of Act 796 of 1993.4
Few statutory provisions have undergone the sort of transformation that
Act 796 imposed upon the previous definition of the term "injury." Once a
humble collection of little more than three lines,5 the new definition of
"compensable injury" is a formidable assemblage of six primary sections
* Law clerk to Commissioner Pat West Humphrey, Arkansas Workers' Compensation
Commission.; B.A. 1991, University of Arkansas at Little Rock;. J.D. 1995, University of
Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law.
1. See Act of Mar. 31, 1993, No. 796 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-101 et. seq.
(Michie Supp. 1993)).
2. See Joseph H. Purvis, From the Respondent: Workers' Compensation Reform, An
Attempt to Save the Goose that Laid the Golden Egg, ARK. LAW., Summer 1993, at 25; Zan
Davis, From the Claimant: Workers' Compensation Reform, Cutting Costs by Eliminating
Employees from Coverage, ARK. LAW., Summer 1993, at 27.
3. See John D. Copeland, The New Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act: Did the
Pendulum Swing Too Far?, 47 ARK. L. REv. 1 (1994).
4. The limitation of this article to the requirements for proving a "compensable injury"
is not meant to imply that the changes wrought by Act 796 are confined to that topic alone.
5. Former ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(4) (Michie 1987) stated that "'injury' means only
accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment, including occupational
diseases as set out in § 11-9-601(e), and occupational infections arising out of and in the course
of employment." ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(4) (Michie 1987).
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divided into twenty-two lesser sections.6 Its swath is wide, covering not only
what a "compensable injury" is, but also what it is not.7 There are previously
unknown phrases such as "rapid repetitive motion" and "major cause."8 The
new definition even turns an old presumption on its head,9 and essentially
prohibits subjective elements such as pain from serving as a basis for
compensation.'0
Given its ambitious scope, and considering its role as the flagship of Act
796, it should come as no surprise that Arkansas Code section 11-9-102(5) has
been the focal point of most recent workers' compensation litigation, and in
turn, the subject of a veritable legion of opinions issued by the Full Workers'
Compensation Commission and the Arkansas Court of Appeals. While a
majority of these cases involve straightforward factual determinations, and may
not be designated for publication, several others have addressed important
questions surrounding the interpretation of what is required to establish a
"compensable injury." Indeed, although the Act is only four-and-a-half years
old, the flurry of caselaw it unleashed has left few of those questions unan-
swered.
II. THE FIVE CATEGORIES OF COMPENSABLE INJURIES
Briefly stated, any injury that "manifests itself' after July 1, 1993, will be
governed by the provisions of Act 796." If the Act controls, the claim will
proceed no further unless the injury falls into one of five categories of injuries
which are eligible for compensation. Those categories are: (1) accidental, or
"specific incident" injuries; (2) gradual injuries, which are further subdivided
into "rapid repetitive motion" injuries, gradual back injuries, and hearing loss
injuries; (3) mental illnesses as set out in section 11-9-113 of the Arkansas
Code; (4) heart or cardiovascular injury, accident, or disease as set out in
section 11-9-114 of the Arkansas Code; and (5) hernia injuries as set out in
Arkansas Code section 11-9-523.2 Regardless of the category involved, a
potential claimant faces a bewildering assortment of evidentiary require-
ments--all of which are called into question once a claim is controverted. 3
6. See ARK. CODE ANN. §1 1-9-102(5)(A)-(F) (Michie Repl. 1996).
7. See ARK. CODE ANN. §1 1-9-102(5)(A), (B) (Michie Repi. 1996).
8. See ARK. CODE ANN. §1 1-9-102(5)(A)(ii)(a), (E)(ii), (F)(ii)(a) (Michie Repl. 1996).
9. See ARK. CODE ANN. §1 1-9-102(5)(B)(iv)(b) (Michie Repl. 1996).
10. See ARK. CODE ANN. § I1-9-102(5)(D), (16)(A) (Michie Repl. 1996).
11. See Act 796 of 1993 § 41 (emergency clause); Buttrum v. City of Fouke, No.
E313688, slip op. at 9 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n Jan. 2, 1997), aff'd, 59 Ark. App. 219, 956
S.W.2d 193 (1997), rev denied (Jan. 22, 1998).
12. See ARK. CODE ANN. §1 1-9-102(5)(A)(i)-(v) (Michie Repl. 1996).
13. See Bennet v. City of Benton, No. E500506, slip op. at 4 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n
266 [Vol. 20
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A. Accidental Injuries Resulting from a "Specific Incident"
The statute begins by identifying what might be thought of as the
"traditional" workers compensation injury:
An accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body
or accidental injury to prosthetic appliances, including eyeglasses, contact
lenses, or hearing aids, arising out of and in the course of employment and
which requires medical services or results in disability or death. An injury
is "accidental" only if it is caused by a specific incident identifiable by time
and place of occurrence.' 4
Claims for "specific incident" ("accidental") injuries are subject to more
than just the requirements set out above. As with most compensable injuries,
they must also be "established by medical evidence supported by 'objective
findings""'15 or "those findings which cannot come under the voluntary control
of the patient."' 6 Furthermore, any medical opinion introduced to establish
compensability "must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical
certainty."' 7
These requirements may not seem particularly unreasonable, but they do
stand in marked contrast to prior law, which charged claimants with little more
than proving "that they sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of
their employment."' 8 Even so, an accidental injury is arguably the simplest
type to establish under Act 796, as it does not involve any of the Act's various
"major cause" provisions. 9 Therefore, once it is clear that Act 796 will apply
to a given claim, the next critical question for both claimant and respondent is
whether the injury can be classified as "accidental."
It is not uncommon for substantial proof of a "specific incident" to reside
within a given claimant's testimony, particularly where the event is recalled in
relatively precise terms:
The appellant related in great detail the onset of her injury. She recounted
a specific time, place, and incident-2:30 p.m. on September 14, 1993, at
the J.C. Penney Store where she had been employed for seventeen years,
Aug. 14, 1996).
14. ARK. CODE ANN. §1 1-9-102(5)(A)(i) (Michie Repl. 1996).
15. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(5)(D) (Michie Repl. 1996).
16. ARK. CODE ANN. §1 1-9-102(16)(A)(i) (Michie Repl. 1996).
17. ARK. CODE ANN. §1 1-9-102(16)(B) (Michie Repl. 1996).
18. See Reed v. Con Agra Frozen Foods, No. E317744, slip op. at 2 (Workers' Comp.
Comm'n Feb. 2, 1995).
19. See Farmland Ins. Co. v. Dubois, 54 Ark. App. 141,923 S.W.2d 883 (1996).
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while bending to remove a piece of jewelry from a case to show a
customer.20
Not all claims will involve such a detailed recollection, and the Full Commis-
sion made it clear in Shepard v. Calion Lumber Co. 21 that other appropriate
evidence will suffice:
Obviously, the General Assembly established this time-place definiteness
requirement to distinguish injuries which occur suddenly, where the
relationship to the employment is more easily seen, from those injuries that
occur over a period of time, where the relationship to the employment may
be more difficult to discern. However, the time of occurrence may be
identified by evidence other than the claimant's testimony regarding the
precise day of the year on which the injury occurred. For example, the
time can be established by evidence of contemporaneous events which
serve to identify the time of occurrence.22
While the foregoing passage from Shepard speaks primarily of the
temporal aspect of accidental injuries, the Full Commission has generally been
reluctant to view the "specific incident" requirement in technical terms. For
instance, in Arnold v. Williamette Industries, Inc.,23 the claimant alleged that
he sustained a back injury on March 27, 1995, while he and a co-worker were
"throwing boards" from an assembly line.24 The claimant's testimony indicated
that he was significantly taller than his partner, which required the claimant to
bend down so that the two could pick up the boards in tandem. When the end
of the board opposite to the claimant dropped without warning, the claimant
"went down with the board," resulting in his asserted injury.2 Although the
claimant contended that he immediately told his co-worker of the injury, the
co-worker later denied having any knowledge until three days after the event.26
Moments after the injury, the claimant went to his foreman's office and
explained that he had injured his back while throwing boards and needed to see
his chiropractor. According to the foreman, the claimant then began looking
through a phone book for the chiropractor's phone number.27 While the
20. See Jordan v. J.C. Penney Co., 57 Ark. App. 174, 177, 944 S.W.2d 547, 549 (1997).
The Arkansas Court of Appeals commented on corroborating testimonial and medical evidence,
but the claimant's own account of an injury clearly played a pivotal role. See id. at 177, 944
S.W.2d at 549.
21. No. E320270 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n Oct. 6, 1995).
22. Shepard v. Calion Lumber Co., No. E320270, slip op. at 9 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n
Oct. 6, 1995).
23. No. E505279 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n Oct. 28, 1996).
24. See Arnold, No. E505279, slip op. at 2.
25. See id.




claimant did manage to continue working until March 29, an MRI scan
performed a few days later revealed a disk herniation in his lumbar spine.
Respondents initially accepted the claim but later controverted on the
grounds that no actual "injury" had occurred on March 27, 1995. 29 Instead,
respondents pointed out that the claimant had been consulting a chiropractor
since 1986 for back and hip pain, and argued that the claimant's "report" of an
injury to his foreman was nothing more than an effort to find his chiropractor's
phone number in order to schedule a routine appointment.30 The Commission
did not find this reasoning persuasive:
The respondent seems to be arguing that the claimant did not specifically
state he had injured his back at that time and this fact coupled with his
history of treatment for back aches by a chiropractor establishes that the
claimant did not injure his back at that time. We find this argument to be
without merit. The distinction the respondent would have us draw between
a report of a specific back injury and a general complaint of back pain is
artificial. The fact remains that the claimant immediately reported an onset
of symptoms arising out of the performance of his employment duties and
a need for medical care as a result of the symptoms.
3
'
The result in Arnold does not guarantee that a claimant's bare assertion of
a specific incident will always be sufficient. In Mikel v. Engineered Specialty
Products,32 the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's finding
that the claimant's carpal tunnel syndrome did not arise from an "accidental"
injury:
The issue before this Court is whether any medical evidence exists to
support the fact that appellant experienced an injury due to a specific
incident, as opposed to her injuries being gradual. Neither doctor
mentioned any swelling of the wrist, as reported by appellant. Appellant
claims that her supervisor witnessed the swelling. However, the supervisor
did not testify to that nor was it stated in the accident report. Both doctors
acknowledge that the appellant has carpal tunnel syndrome, but neither
acknowledge that it was caused by a specific incident .... After reviewing
28. See id., slip op. at 5.
29. See id., slip op. at 6.
30. See Arnold, No. E505279, slip op. at 6. Respondents also challenged claimant's
credibility in light of certain testimony from his co-workers and his own previous deposition.
See id. However, based on its de novo review of the entire record (including claimant's medical
history and testimony tending to corroborate his account of an injury) the Commission found
claimant's testimony to be credible--a function squarely within its fact-finding powers and
duties. See Arnold, slip op. at 1-2; McClain v. Texaco, 29 Ark. App. 218, 780 S.W.2d 34
(1989); Johnson v. Hux, 28 Ark. App. 187, 772 S.W.2d 362 (1989).
31. Arnold, No. E505279, slip op. at 9.
32. 56 Ark. App. 126, 938 S.W.2d 876 (1997).
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the medical testimony by both doctors, this court agrees that the appellant
did not prove her claim by a preponderance of the evidence.33
Even though the claimant in Mikel contended that her injury arose when
"something in her wrist snapped,"' neither the Commission nor the Court
found sufficient medical or testimonial evidence to corroborate her account.
Likewise, it can be harmful to a "specific incident" claim when pertinent
medical records state that no specific injury occurred, or relate a history of
gradually increasing symptoms which eventually culminate in an acute
episode.35 In addition, a "spontaneous onset of pain," standing alone and
unrelated to any particular work incident, will not qualify a given injury as
"accidental., 36
B. Gradual Injuries
Not all injuries must result from an identifiable "accident" to be eligible
for compensation. Arkansas Code section 11-9-102(5)(A)(ii)(a)-(c) codifies
the previous judicial recognition that a "specific incident" is not the sine qua
non of compensability.37 Even so, the schedule of gradual injuries which may
qualify for compensation is not open-ended, and it is necessary that a particular
gradual injury fall into one of three prescribed categories before the question
of compensability will even be entertained. 3' The available categories are: (a)
injuries caused by "rapid repetitive motion," including carpal tunnel syndrome;
(b) back injuries not caused by a specific incident or not identifiable by time
and place of occurrence; and (c) hearing loss injuries not caused by a specific
incident or not identifiable by time and place of occurrence.39
Hearing loss claims are rare and usually focus on questions of causal
connection or degree of impairment.4° Gradual back injuries are more
33. Id. at 129-30, 938 S.W.2d at 878-79.
34. Id. at 127, 938 S.W.2d at 877.
35. See, e.g., Moore v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., No. E411456, slip op. at 4 (Workers' Comp.
Comm'n Oct. 13, 1995); Salyards v. Gemini Mfg., Inc., No. E318949, slip op. at 9 (Workers'
Comp. Comm'n July 29, 1996), aff'd, No. CA96-1234 (June 11, 1997) (not designated for
publication).
36. McQuany v. Siemen's Energy and Automation, No. E318760, slip op. at 5-6
(Workers' Comp. Comm'n Oct. 13, 1995). In McQuany, the claimant's own testimony was
fatal: "It was no one specific lifting motion that I noticed the pain." Id., slip op. at 6.
37. See Marcoe v. Bell Int'l, 48 Ark. App. 33, 35, 888 S.W.2d 663,665 (1994).
38. See Tillman v. Baldwin & Shell Constr. Co., 58 Ark. App. 177, 179-80, 948 S.W.2d
118, 119 (1997).
39. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(ii)(a)-(c) (Michie Repl. 1996).
40. See, e.g., Kilgore v. Rheem Mfg. Co., No. E304918 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n Aug.
18, 1994); Colson v. International Paper Co., No. E200043 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n Feb. 3,
1995). Both of these cases were decided under prior law, which was changed only by the
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common, and differ from "accidental" back injuries mainly because they bring
the "major cause" requirement into play.4' Indeed, all gradual injuries must
meet the major cause requirement, discussed in greater detail below.
By far the most common gradual injury claims are those involving rapid
repetitive motion, particularly as it relates to the development of carpal tunnel
syndrome. Although it is an important phrase, "rapid repetitive motion" is not
defined by statute. Therefore, the task has devolved upon the Full Commission
and, subsequently, the Arkansas Court of Appeals. The Commission first
addressed the question in Throckmorton v. J. & J. Metals,42 perhaps one of its
better known decisions. Throckmorton involved a claimant employed as a
"drop-boy" responsible for picking up sheet metal scraps. The claimant began
his duties in October, 1993, and by the early part of 1994 had developed
numbness and tingling in his hands.43 A diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome
soon followed.44
The Throckmorton majority first noted that Act 796 provides no guidance
as to what kind of activity qualifies as "rapid repetitive motion. ' 45 Clearly
mindful of its statutory duty to "strictly construe" Act 796, 6 the majority
essentially turned to a plain-language approach:
However, the term "rapid" is commonly used to refer to that which is
marked by a notably high rate of motion, activity, succession, or occur-
rence, requiring notably little time, and without delay or hesitation. See,
Webster's Third New Unabridged International Dictionary (1986). The
term "repetitive" is commonly used for the act of doing the exact same
thing again and again. Id.47
From these two unadorned definitions, the majority crafted a standard that
would govern rapid repetitive motion claims for the next two years:
Thus, we find that the requirement that the condition be caused by rapid
repetitive motion requires proof that claimant's employment duties
involved, at least in part, a notably high rate of activity involving the exact,
addition of the "major cause" requirement to hearing loss injuries which manifest themselves
after July 1, 1993. With this exception, an analysis of hearing loss claims should generally be
unaffected by Act 796.
41. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(E)(ii) ( Michie Repl. 1996).
42. No. E405318 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n Aug. 14, 1995).
43. See Throclnorton, slip op at 2.
44. See id.
45. See id., slip op. at 3-4.
46. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-704(c)(3) (Michie Repl. 1996), which provides that
"[a]dministrative law judges, the commission, and any reviewing courts shall construe the
provisions of this chapter strictly." Id.
47. Throckmnorton, slip op. at 4.
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or almost exactly, same movement again and again over extended periods
of time. Obviously, the determination of whether a certain employment
duty satisfies the statutory requirement for rapid repetitive motion is a fact
question which must be decided based on the evidence presented in each
case. Furthermore, we point out that the statute does not require proof that
the employee's duties involved rapid repetitive motion for the entire
duration of the employee's shift or that he engaged in such activities every
day.
48
In Throckmorton, the claimant performed a task that was arguably
repetitive, picking up sheet metal scraps, but fell far short of being "rapid"
insofar as the new standard envisioned it. Particularly fatal to the claimant's
position was the fact that he allowed the pieces of scrap metal to accumulate
before retrieving them, which produced anywhere from a one to twenty-five
minute delay between pick-ups.49 However, the majority opinion in
Throckmorton established an extremely challenging standard, and it is
questionable whether the claimant's particular task could have met that
standard even absent the lengthy delays-it did not, after all, easily lend itself
to being performed at a "notably high rate of speed" under any circumstances.
Likewise, the necessity for a motion to be "almost exactly the same" to qualify
as "repetitive" essentially precluded claims based on motion which may have
been performed very quickly but consisted of a series of differing actions. This
relative inflexibility, particularly the latter aspect, eventually proved to be
Throckmorton's undoing.
The Arkansas Court of Appeals first considered the Throckmorton
standard in Baysinger v. Air Systems, Inc.,5" which involved a claimant with
"multiple-task" employment duties:
In deciding this case, the Commission examined the job duties of appellant.
Testimony by three of appellant's co-workers showed that his tasks
included shaping, molding, fimishing, and polishing stainless-steel
equipment. His work with metal involved grinding, polishing, finishing
curved edges, and removing burrs. The Commission found that although
appellant's duties varied during the day according to the particular item
being manufactured, his duties required him to grip vibrating tools and to
use a ball-peen hammer, and that each of the duties involved fairly constant
stress and shock to the hands, wrists, and arms."
48. Id.
49. See id., slip op. at 5.
50. 55 Ark. App. 174, 934 S.W.2d 230 (1996).
51. Baysinger, 55 Ark. App. at 175, 934 S.W.2d at 231.
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Despite finding that the claimant's duties were hand intensive and
"involved fairly constant stress and shock to the... wrists," the Commission
determined that they did not amount to rapid repetitive motion under the
Throcknorton standard,5 2 since they consisted of different steps that did not
involve "the exact, or almost exactly, the same movement again and again
.*. "" The Arkansas Court of Appeals, though it did not articulate a new
definition, disagreed with this approach:
The Commission erred in requiring appellant to prove that his carpal tunnel
syndrome was the result of the exact, or almost exactly, the same move-
ment again and again .... We feel that the Commission's interpretation of
the statute is too restrictive and precludes multiple tasks - such as the
hammering and grinding motions performed by claimant - from being
considered together to satisfy the requirements of the statute.M
By deeming at least half of it "too restrictive," Baysinger arguably dealt
the Throckmorton standard a mortal blow. As a result, the Full Commission
began to move away from Throckmorton," though it suggested on one
occasion that the Arkansas Court of Appeals had simply disagreed with its
"factual assessment" of "multiple-task" rapid repetitive claims.56 For its own
part, the Arkansas Court of Appeals declined a second opportunity to define
"rapid repetitive motion" in Lay v. United Parcel Service,57 but shortly
thereafter provided a much clearer picture of Throckmorton's status in Kildow
v. Baldwin Piano & Organ.58
The claimant in Kildow performed a hand-intensive task which required
her to secure electrical components to boards with wires that she twisted into
place using pliers. While twisting the wires with her right hand, the claimant
held onto the board with her left. 9 Once all the components were secured to
52. While the Arkansas Court of Appeals never referred to Throckmorton by name, it
noted in Baysinger the Comission's comment that "[t]he requirement that the condition be
caused by rapid, repetitive motion requires proof that the employment duties involved, at least
in part, a notably high rate of activity involving the exact, or almost exactly, the same




55. See, e.g., Bunn v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., No. E415001 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n
April 8, 1997); Phillips v. Potlatch Corp., No. E513249 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n June 4,
1997).
56. See Mullins v. Hytrol Conveyor, No. E600667, slip op. at 4 (Workers' Comp.
Comm'n March 13, 1997).
57. 58 Ark. App. 35, 944 S.W.2d 867 (1997).
58. 58 Ark. App. 194, 948 S.W.2d 100 (1997).
59. See Kildow, 58 Ark. App. at 197, 948 S.W.2d at 102.
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a given board, she passed the completed unit on to the next work station. After
carrying out these duties for approximately one year, eight to ten hours a day,
five to six days a week, the claimant developed gradually worsening pain in her
wrists.60 At both the Administrative Law Judge and Full Commission levels,
the claimant's duties were found to be insufficiently rapid to qualify for
benefits. 61 In reversing that decision, the Arkansas Court of Appeals specifi-
cally noted the Commission's reliance on Throckmorton:
In denying benefits for appellant's CTS, the Commission relied on
the requirements for gradual-onset injuries announced in its own opinion,
Throckmorton, supra. Notably the Commission defines the two terms,
"rapid repetitive," together as a single, interrelated concept.
However, our holding in Baysinger v. Air Systems, 55 Ark. App. 174,
934 S.W.2d 230 (1996), rejected the Commission's language "exact, or
almost exactly, the same movement again and again." In light of our
holding in Baysinger, the Commission's decision in Throckinorton is
erroneous, as a matter of law, to the extent that it requires claimants to
prove "exact, or almost exactly, the same movement again and again."
In discerning a definition for the term "rapid repetitive," we are
bound to give the words their ordinary meaning, give effect to the intent
of the legislature, and make use of common sense. State Office of Child
Support Enforcement v. Harnage, 322 Ark. 461, 910 S.W.2d 207 (1995).
In its ordinary usage, rapid means swift or quick. CONCISE OXFORD
DICTIONARY 1137 (9th ed. 1995).62
Though there was no indication of how many boards the claimant might
have processed in an average day, the Court went on to state that: "It is clear
to us that reasonable minds could not agree that appellant's testimony does not
establish that her job did involve swift or quick motion .... [I]t is a matter of
common sense that reasonable minds would expect work on an assembly line
to move at a swift or quick pace."63 The Court eventually found the claimant's
duties to be repetitive as well, though it did not expressly define that term.64
Kildow offers a relatively straightforward definition of the term "rapid,"
for example, "swift or quick," but also comes close to creating a form of
rebuttable presumption. After all, there was little or no real evidence offered
as to just how "swift or quick" the claimant had performed her assembly-line
60. See id.
61. See id. at 198, 948 S.W.2d at 102.
62. Id. at 200, 948 S.W.2d at 103.
63. Id. at 201, 948 S.W.2d at 103-04.
64. See id. at 201, 948 S.W.2d at 104.
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duties. Further, the Court provided no accompanying definition of the
"repetitive" aspect of the dual requirement. What then, is the case's effect?
Ultimately, Kildow is best understood by realizing the Arkansas Court of
Appeals' reluctance to define "rapid repetitive motion" at all. In a footnote to
the decision, the Court stated that:
At least one commentator has noted the anomalous inclusion of
"rapid" in Arkansas's statute, and suggested that, "Possibly, the term rapid
does not have any real significance in the 1993 Act. The addition of the
term may be the result of inartful drafting arising out of the common
knowledge that many repetitive motion cases involve rapid repetitive
motion." John D. Copeland, The New Workers' Compensation Act; Did
the Pendulum Swing Too Far?, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1994).
We are mindful that assigning meaning to the term "rapid repetitive"
may inappropriately exclude valid work-related carpal tunnel syndrome
claims in certain fields of work that are characterized not by the speed of
the work, but by abnormally strenuous or meticulous activity with the
hands. We welcome from the legislature their promise in Act 796 of 1993
stating in part, "In the future, if such things as... the extent to which any
physical condition, injury or disease should be excluded from or added to
coverage by the law... it shall be addressed by the General Assembly...
and not by the courts.65
Based upon this passage, it is a fair assumption that the Arkansas Court
of Appeals will not attempt any further definition of "rapid repetitive motion."
For now, the most that can be said is that motion should at least be "swift or
quick" before it will qualify as "rapid." Since Kildow, the Commission has
continued its move away from Throckmorton and toward a case-by-case
approach,66 although at least one principal opinion quoted Judge Wendell
Griffen's dissent from Kildow, in which he proposed that "rapid repetitive
motion" be defined as a "'fast or notably high rate of recurring motion,
processes, or actions. However, because it originated from a dissenting
opinion, and considering the Arkansas Court of Appeals' comments in Kildow,
it is unlikely that the Full Commission will adopt Judge Griffen's position.68
65. Kildow, 58 Ark. App. at 200, 948 S.W.2d at 103.
66. See, e.g., Barnette v. Southern Steel & Wire, No. E603971 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n
Aug. 13, 1997); Henderson v. Chem-Fab Corp., No. E603760 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n Aug.
20, 1997); Lutrell v. Central Maloney, No. E601411 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n Sept. 23,
1997).
67. Boyd v. Dana Corp., No. E604907, slip op. at 5 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n Sept. 26,
1997) (quoting Kildow, 58 Ark. App. at 206, 948 S.W.2d at 106 (Griffen, J., dissenting)).
68. However, Judge Griffen's proposal does seem more inclusive and flexible than the
Throckmorton standard, and also offers the comfort of a general rule.
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C. Hernias, Mental Illnesses, and Heart/Lung Injuries
While the majority of workers' compensation claims involve either an
accidental or gradual injury, the Arkansas Code provides three additional
categories of injuries which may qualify for compensation. They are as
follows: mental illness as set out in section 11-9-113; heart, cardiovascular
injury, accident, or disease as set out in section 11-9-114; and hernia injuries
as set out in section 11-9-523.69
Act 796 of 1993 did not alter Arkansas Code section 11-9-523, and the
statutory provisions and case law governing hernia injuries prior to July 1,
1993, are generally still in effect. Consequently, hernias will not receive
further discussion, except to point out the requirements of the statute:
(a) In all cases of claims for hernia, it shall be shown to the satisfaction of
the Workers' Compensation Commission:
(1) That the occurrence of the hernia immediately followed as the result
of sudden effort, severe strain, or the application of force directly to the
abdominal wall;
(2) That there was severe pain in the hernial region;
(3) That the pain caused the employee to cease work immediately;
(4) That notice of the occurrence was given to the employer within forty-
eight (48) hours thereafter; and
(5) That the physical distress following the occurrence of the hernia was
such as to require the attendance of a licensed physician within seventy-
two (72) hours after the occurrence.70
In sharp contrast, Act 796 considerably strengthened the requirements
surrounding cardiac injuries and mental illnesses, which had previously been
matters of case law.71 Indeed, of all the injuries eligible for compensation,
69. See ARK. CODE ANN. §1 l-9-102(5)(A)(iii)-(v) (Michie Repl. 1996).
70. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-523 (Michie Repl. 1996). With regard to requirement (5), it
is not necessary that an employee prove that he or she actually consulted a physician within the
seventy-two hour period. Instead, it is generally sufficient to show that the claimant's post-
injury distress was sufficient to merit the attentions of a physician. See, e.g., Ayres v. Historic
Preservation Assoc., 24 Ark. App. 40, 747 S.W.2d 587 (1988).
71. See, e.g., Dugan v. Jerry Sweetster, Inc., 54 Ark. App. 401,928 S.W.2d 341 (1996),
wherein Judge Wendell Griffen noted that: "Prior to Act 796, workers' compensation benefits
were upheld for mental illness in a variety of situations ranging from psychological disorders
resulting from traumatic physical injury to nontraumatic experiences involving job stress." Id.
at 403, 928 S.W.2d at 342 (citations omitted). Also, in Fowler v. McHenry, 22 Ark. App. 196,
737 S.W.2d 663, (1987), the Arkansas Court of Appeals stated that: "When it is established
that the claimant was putting forth unusual exertion in his work at the time of the heart attack
it will ordinarily be held that the requirement of causal connection has been met. Absent
'unusual exertion' the applicable test is whether the required exertion producing the injury is
too great for the person undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or the condition
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those of a cardiac or mental nature are among the most difficult to establish.
Moreover, even if a mental illness or injury is found to be work-related, the Act
limits compensability to twenty-six weeks,72 and no death attributable to a
mental injury or illness (whether directly or indirectly) will be compensable if
the death occurs "one (1) year or more" from the date of the precipitating
event.73
1. Mental Injury or Illness
The requirements for establishing a compensable mental injury or illness
are listed in Arkansas Code section 11-9-1 13(a)(1)-(2) state that:
(a)(1) A mental injury or illness is not a compensable injury unless it is
caused by physical injury to the employee's body, and shall not be
considered an injury arising out of and in the course of employment or
compensable unless it is demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence;
provided, however, that this physical injury limitation shall not apply to
any victim of a crime of violence.
(2) No mental injury or illness under this section shall be compensable
unless it is also diagnosed by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist and
unless the diagnosis of the condition meets the criteria established in the
most current issue of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders.74
The "physical injury" requirement of subsection (a)(1) virtually eliminates
compensation for mental illnesses resulting from job-related stress, unless a
"violent crime" is somehow the source of the malady. The inclusion of this
exception seems anomalous, since violent crimes usually are associated with
a physical injury of some kind. As of this date, the "violent crime" exception
has not been addressed by either the Full Commission or the Arkansas Court
of Appeals--perhaps an indication of the unique factual situation required to
bring it into play. The "physical injury" requirement itself, however, has been
considered by both entities--most notably in Dugan v. Jerry Sweetster, Inc. 75
Dugan indicates that a relatively minimal physical injury will suffice for
purposes of Arkansas Code section 11-9-1 13(a)(1). It should be noted that the
ten-second electrical shock the claimant received was certainly not minimal
of his health, provided the exertion is either the sole or a contributing cause of the injury." Id.
at 203, 737 S.W.2d at 666 (citations omitted).
72. See ARK. CODE ANN. §11-9-113(b)(l) (Michie Repl. 1996).
73. See ARK. CODE ANN. § I1-9-113(b)(2)(B) (Michie Repl. 1996).
74. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-113(a)(1), (2) (Michie Repl. 1996).
75. 54 Ark. App. 401, 928 S.W.2d 341 (1996); see also Amlease v. Kuligowski, 59 Ark.
App. 261, 957 S.W.2d 715 (1997).
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itself, but the incident left little physical evidence beyond a three to four
millimeter burn wound on the claimant's hand where the current entered his
body.76 Nevertheless, the claimant had been out of the hospital only a brief
time when he began to experience stuttering, difficulty in walking, and loss of
consciousness." Although extensive diagnostic efforts revealed no abnormali-
ties, the claimant's physical difficulties gradually increased. Eventually, the
claimant's treating neurosurgeon, as well as a clinical psychologist, determined
that he suffered from a number of mental disorders which they attributed to the
electrical shock injury.78 However, the Full Commission reversed the
Administrative Law Judge's award of benefits, as the Arkansas Court of
Appeals pointed out:
The Commission denied compensation to Dugan because it held that the
preponderance of the evidence failed to show "actual demonstrable
damage, impairment, wound, or other bodily harm or disorder to the
internal or external structure of the body." For this definition of "physical
injury," the Commission relied on Larson's workers' compensation treatise
and other medical and legal dictionaries. The Commission's opinion also
imported language from the statutory definition of "compensable injury"
which requires medical evidence supported by objective findings. ARK.
CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(5)(D) and (16). 79
After noting several definitions of the term "injury," the Dugan majority
reversed the Commission:
The undisputed facts of this case show that Dugan received a 3-4 mm bum
(the entry port) to his hand when the shock occurred. That burn is
documented in the medical records, and by all accounts was caused by the
electrical shock. Hence, it is clear that Dugan received an electrical shock
in the course of his employment that produced a physical injury. He
suffered a 3-4 mm bum on his hand where the electric current entered his
body. Even if the more elaborate diagnostic tests such as the MRI and
EKG produced no abnormal findings, it is inescapable that he suffered a
wound to his hand .... Here, we have a physical injury; namely, an
observable wound to the external structure of the body. 0
76. See Dugan, 54 Ark. App. at 402, 928 S.W.2d at 341.
77. See id., 928 S.W.2d at 341.
78. See id. at 402-03, 928 S.W.2d at 341-42. Dugan's physicians found him to be
suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome, conversion reaction, and depression. See id.,
928 S.W.2d at 341-42.
79. Id. at 404, 928 S.W.2d at 342.
80. Id. at 404-05, 928 S.W.2d at 343.
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Thus, Dugan suggests that the extent of the physical injury required by
subsection (a)(1) is not particularly great. However, the case still seems to turn
on the presence of an "objective" finding. Accordingly, though Dugan gives
no real indication that the physical injury must be predicated on some
observable basis, it is not clear whether the Court would have reached the same
result in the absence of at least a minimal objective finding. Adding to this
uncertainty is the fact that the Court discussed a Connecticut case where
nothing more than "inappropriate touching" produced a compensable mental
disorder, as well as a Florida case which found "touching" insufficient and
relied instead on "a bite and scratch on the hand of a paramedic."'" For now
at least, the question remains one of the few lingering mysteries of Act 796.
The requirements of subsection (a)(2) are fairly straightforward but cannot
be taken lightly. For example, it is not enough to submit evidence of an illness
that is categorized within the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV) if there is no specific diagnosis from a licensed psychia-
trist or psychologist.8 2 Along the same lines, it will not suffice to simply
introduce office notes detailing the generalized observations of a licensed
psychiatrist or psychologist. 3 In sum, subsection (a)(2) is an "all or nothing"
proposition.
It should be noted that the Full Commission has made a distinction
between mental illnesses caused by a "physical injury to the employee's body,"
and thus governed by the mental injury statute, and those produced by an
organic cause which are treated as ordinary accidental injuries. In Coffman v.
Jones Timber Co.,84 the Commission determined that a "cognitive dysfunction"
attributable to an "actual physical trauma" to the claimant's brain had an
organic basis (from the brain injury itself, rather than an injury such as that in
Dugan) that removed it from the ambit of the mental illness statute. Conse-
quently, the claimant was not subject to the twenty-six week limitation on
benefits. Although the extent of this "organic cause" exception is unclear, it
is important to realize that injuries involving mental deficits may not always be
subject to Arkansas Code section 11-9-113.
81. Id. at 405, 928 S.W.2d at 343 (citing Crochiere v. Board of Educ., 630 A.2d 1027
(Conn. 1993); City of Hollywood v. Karl, 643 So.2d 34 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994)).
82. See Stockton v. Rose Care, Inc., No. E404773, slip op. at 12-14 (Workers' Comp.
Comm'n Feb. 13, 1996).
83. See id., slip op. at 12-14.
84. No. E511952 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n August 13, 1997).
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2. Heart and Lung Injuries
Arkansas Code section 11-9-114 contains the requirements for proving a
work-related "heart or lung injury or illness":
(a) A cardiovascular, coronary, pulmonary, respiratory, or cerebrovascular
accident or myocardial infarction causing injury, illness, or death is a
compensable injury only if, in relation to other factors contributing to the
physical harm, an accident is the major cause of the physical harm.
(b)(1) An injury or disease included in subsection (a) of this section shall
not be deemed to be a compensable injury unless it is shown that the
exertion of the work necessary to precipitate the disability or death was
extraordinary and unusual in comparison to the employee's usual work in
the course of the employee's regular employment or, alternately, that some
unusual and unpredicted incident occurred which is found to have been the
major cause of the physical harm.
(b)(2) Stress, physical or mental, shall not be considered in determining
whether the employee or claimant has met his burden of proof.85
By subjecting cardiovascular-type injuries to the "major cause" require-
ment, Act 796 imposes a considerable burden of proof given the role that
lifelong processes or habits (such as atherosclerosis or smoking) often play in
heart and lung ailments. Equally striking (though consistent with the "physical
injury" requirement for mental illness claims) is the fact that stress, even if job-
related, cannot be submitted as proof of compensability. This exclusion is
consistent with the "physical injury" requirement for mental illness claims.
Subsection (a) does not define the term "accident" within the heart/lung
injury context. However, in City ofBlytheville v. McCormick,8 6 the Arkansas
Court of Appeals held that "accident" refers to an event "caused by a specific
incident and identifiable by time and place of occurrence,"87 and went on to
affirm the Commission's finding that the claimant's heart attack was indeed the
product of an "accident" which amounted to "extraordinary and unusual" work
activity in comparison with his normal duties:
In light of this construction and the evidence that the appellee
suffered a heart attack caused by and immediately following his exposure
to smoke while ventilating the roof of the burning building, we hold that
the Commission did not err in finding that an accident was the major cause
of the appellee's heart attack.
85. ARK. CODE ANN. §11-9-114 (Michie Repi. 1996).
86. 56 Ark. App. 149, 939 S.W.2d 855 (1997).
87. McCormick, 56 Ark. App. at 154, 939 S.W.2d at 857.
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Nor do we think that the Commission erred in finding that the work
that precipitated the appellee's heart attack was unusual and extraordinary
in comparison to the appellee's usual work duties. There was evidence that
the appellee was normally assigned to drive a fire truck, and that he would
perform other tasks only when he answered a call while off-duty.
Furthermore, there was evidence that the appellee inhaled a good deal of
smoke that was unusually heavy, dark, and thick immediately prior to his
heart attack.88
It is significant that the duty the claimant performed immediately before
his heart attack (ventilating the roof of a burning building) was a task arguably
expected of a firefighter. This fact did not preclude a finding that such a duty
was "extraordinary and unusual" to the particular claimant in McCormick. In
other words, as the language of the statute implies, the test for determining
whether a given exertion is "extraordinary and unusual" is essentially
subjective (a rarity within Act 796).
It is also of interest that the claimant in McCormick had suffered another
heart attack approximately one year prior to his work-related heart attack,
resulting in bypass surgery. However, the claimant's treating physician
attributed the second heart attack largely to "his exposure to heavy smoke,
which caused his blood to become hypercoagulable and [result] in the
formation of a clot,"89 and further opined that the risks associated with the
claimant's underlying heart disease were no more than ten percent
responsible.90 In light of these circumstances, the Court affirmed the Commis-
sion's finding that the "accident" was the major cause of the claimant's second
heart attack.
The Commission subsequently relied on McCormick in Couch v. Arkansas
State Police,9' which involved a state trooper who suffered a heart attack after
a high-speed chase. The Commission found, first of all, that the chase itself
constituted an "accident" since it was a "specific incident identifiable by time
and place of occurrence. ' ' 92 Also, as in McCormick, the Commission took a
relatively subjective approach to determine that the high speed chase amounted
to an "unusual and unpredicted incident":
While it cannot be said that high-speed chases are unheard of in law
enforcement, the evidence in the instant case reveals that such an event was
decidedly uncommon to the particular work activities claimant was
88. Id. at 154-55, 939 S.W.2d at 857-58.
89. Id. at 153, 939 S.W.2d at 857.
90. See id.
91. No. E500890 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n May 29, 1997), rev'd, No. CA 97-1033, slip
op. at 2 (Ark. App. Mar. 18, 1998).
92. See Couch, slip op. at 5-6.
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required to perform. When asked at the hearing how many high-speed
pursuits he had engaged in that were similar to that of October 29, 1994,
claimant estimated that there had been no more than five or six over his
thirty year career.93
Likewise, the Commission noted that the claimant served as a "Post
Sergeant," and that his duties included highway patrol no more than twenty
percent of the time--much of which he simply spent in transit.94 Another
trooper testified that he had participated in only three high-speed pursuits
during eleven years as a Post Sergeant.95 Finally, the Commission found that
the "temporal proximity" between the claimant's accident and heart attack was
sufficient to establish a "major cause" relationship between the two events.96
While McCormick and Couch illustrate that benefits are not unattainable
under Arkansas Code section 11-9-114, the statute has compelled different
results. For instance, Williford v. North Little Rock Fire Department9 7 involved
a firefighter who participated in a physical fitness test on July 6, 1995. Shortly
after the test, he went to a local emergency room with complaints of back pain,
nausea, and vomiting.9 The claimant already possessed a signficant medical
history, including difficulty with diabetes and hypertension."
The claimant died on July 9 from causes his treating physician described
as "[a]cute myocardial infarction with congestive heart failure and subsequent
93. Id., slip op. at 6.
94. See id., slip op. at 2.
95. See id., slip op. at 6.
96. See id., slip op. at 7. Shortly before publication of this article, the Arkansas Court of
Appeals remanded Couch to the Full Commission with instructions to make additional findings
on the "major cause" issue. On appeal, respondents had argued that "because neither appellee's
treating cardiologist nor any other physician has stated that the chase was a 'major cause' of the
myocardial infarction, the Commission erred in deciding that the appellee suffered a
compensable injury." Arkansas State Police v. Couch, No. CA 97-1033, slip op. at 2 (Ark.
App. Mar. 18, 1998). In reaching its decision, the Court stated that "nowhere in the
Commission's finding does there appear medical evidence to the effect that in relation to
appellee's coronary artery disease, the accident appellee experienced was the major cause of the
physical harm." Id., slip op. at 4. Though unpublished, the Court's comments in Couch at least
give the impression that a medical opinion is necessary to resolve a major cause question, for
there would seem to be little other "medical evidence" that could achieve the effect sought by
the Court's remand. However, in a published opinion handed down only a few weeks prior to
the decision in Couch, the Court of Appeals addressed a similar proposition: "Appellant asserts
that an expert, meaning a physician, must state what the major cause was. However, the
legislature did not so limit the acceptable evidence that could be considered." See High
Capacity Products v. Moore, No. CA 97-880, 1998 WL 75961 (Ark. App. Feb. 25, 1998). It
would seem then, that it is still an open question as to whether medical evidence is actually
necessary to resolve major cause issues.
97. No. E510333 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n Sept. 23, 1997).
98. See Williford, slip op. at 3.
99. See id., slip op. at 4.
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cardiac failure, complicated by diabetes, renal failure, hypertension and chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease."'0 Though some medical evidence suggested
that the fitness test was the major cause of the claimant's heart attack, the Full
Commission concluded otherwise:
In short, we find that the greater weight of the credible evidence establishes
that Mr. Williford experienced a number of preexisting coronary condi-
tions (atherosclerosis, congenital valve abnormality, enlarged heart) and
other risk factors (diabetes, hypertension, pulmonary disease) prior to July
6, 1995. In light of Dr. Bierle's testimony that he could not agree (in light
of laboratory data) that Mr. Williford sustained a myocardial infarction
during the course of his activities on July 6, 1995, and in light of Dr.
Peretti's testimony that the claimant's preexisting abnormalities rendered
his health so compromised that [claimant] could have had a coronary event
walking down the street, we find that claimant failed to establish that...
any alleged coronary accident on July 6, 1995, was the major cause of
[claimant's] myocardial infarction.'0 '
Given his medical history, it is unlikely that the claimant in Williford
could have received workers' compensation benefits for a heart attack under
any circumstances. Indeed, Williford is a prime example of just how
formidable the major cause requirement can be in some cases.
II. "MAJOR CAUSE"
The term "major cause" simply means "more than fifty percent (50%) of
the cause,"'0 2 but this brevity is no indication of how important the major cause
requirement can be in certain types of workers' compensation claims.
Specifically, major cause will be at issue in cases involving: (1) gradual
injuries;' '3 (2) permanent impairment or disability;' 4 (3) pre-existing
conditions that combine with a compensable injury to prolong a disability or
need for treatment; 15 and (4) heart/lung injuries. '6
Workers' compensation findings depend on the facts of each particullar
claim, and those relating to major cause are no exception. Still, a few general
observations are available. First among them is the Full Commission's
100. Id., slip op. at 5.
101. Id., slip op. at 13-14 (emphasis added).
102. ARK. CODE ANN. §I 1-9-102(14)(A) (Michie Repl. 1996). See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 11-9-102(14)(B) (Michie Repl. 1996), which requires a finding of major cause to be
"established according to the preponderance of the evidence."
103. See ARK. CODE ANN. §1 1-9-102(5)(E)(ii) (Michie Repl. 1996).
.104. See ARK. CODE ANN. §1 1-9-102(5)(F)(ii)(a), (b) (Michie Repl. 1996).
105. See ARK. CODE ANN. §I 1-9-102(5)(F)(ii)(b) (Michie Repl. 1996).
106. See AK. CODE ANN. §11-9-114(a), (b)(1) (Michie Repl. 1996).
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acceptance of the tendency to state the major cause issue in terms of a
claimant's "work activities," when in reality, the actual question is whether the
"compensable injury" itself is the major cause of a given disability, impairment,
or need for treatment. For example, in Sexton v. First Brands Corporation,
10 7
the Commission found that the claimant had satisfied the major cause
requirement since her treating physician provided affirmative answers to the
following inquiries:
1. Based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty [claimant's] work
activity was the major cause of her need for treatment for her right carpal
tunnel syndrome.
2. Based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty [claimant's] work
activity was the major cause of her disability due to her right carpal tunnel
syndrome.'08
In reaching its conclusion, the Commission reasoned as follows:
We note, of course, that this issue is properly stated in terms of whether
claimant's ji was the major cause of her disability or need for
treatment. See ARK. CODE ANN. §1 1-9-102(5)(E)(ii) (Repl. 1996).
However, it is a logical conclusion that if claimant's work activities were
the major cause of her injury and the resulting disability and need for
treatment, then the injury itself is by implication the major cause of the
resulting disability or need for treatment.' 9
While medical evidence was important to the outcome in Sexton, the Full
Commission's findings in Couch"0 indicate that such evidence is not always
imperative to establish major cause."' However, when available, medical
evidence will usually play a pivotal role. For instance, in McCormick, the
claimant's treating physician opined that "appellee's exposure to smoke...
was by far the major cause of his heart attack, with all other factors combined
amounting to less than ten percent by comparison."'" 2 Medical evidence was
similarly paramount in Smith v. Gerber Products,' '3 where two physicians
attributed the claimant's symptoms to "degenerative changes." In affirming the
Commission's denial of benefits, the Arkansas Court of Appeals observed that
the claimant's treating physician "would have given Ms. Smith the same work
restrictions solely on the basis of the degenerative changes which preceded her
107. No. E416667 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n Sept. 24, 1996).
108. Sexton, slip op. at 7.
109. Id., slip op. at 7-8 (emphasis in original).
110. See Couch, No. E500980 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n May 29, 1997).
1!1. See supra note 96 for a discussion of major cause.
112. McCormick, 56 Ark. App. at 155, 939 S.W.2d at 858.
113. 54 Ark. App. 57, 922 S.W.2d 365 (1996).
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injury." '114 Despite the obvious importance of medical evidence to a major
cause analysis, the potential impact of non-medical factors should not be
discounted. For example, where a claimant has diminished his credibility by
virtue of inaccurate testimony, his effort to satisfy the major cause requirement
may suffer as well. 15
Clearly, pre-existing or underlying conditions such as "degenerative
changes" can make the major cause requirement especially challenging. On
one occasion, the Full Commission denied compensation for carpal tunnel
syndrome where the claimant "functioned in [his] job for over twenty years
with relatively little problems, and it was not until after he was diagnosed with
diabetes that he began to experience significant problems."' 6 Similarly, a
claimant's past physical activities can be problematic. In Herrera v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., 1 7 the Commission noted that the claimant's shoulder problems
improved only slightly after she left her employment, and further pointed out
that the claimant "had been a laborer for over twenty years. She previously had
worked in California for eighteen years picking strawberries which required
repetitive motion of her hands and arms."'' 8
In a fairly recent claim involving a dentist afflicted with cervical disc
disease, the Full Commission compared "the nature of the claimant's work with
the nature of his underlying medical abnormality. . ." to determine that the
major cause requirement had not been met." 9 In this instance, the Commission
observed that the claimant had been a dentist for over thirty years when he
began to experience neck pain and numbness in his right hand." 0 Subsequent
diagnostic efforts revealed significant nerve root compression attributable to
degenerative changes in the claimant's cervical spine. 2' While the claimant's
family physician related the claimant's symptoms to his work, the Commission
disagreed:
In the present case, we find that the preponderance of the credible evidence
in the record establishes that the "major cause" of the claimant's cervical
problems is the development of degenerative osteophyte abnormalities
114. Id. at 59, 922 S.W.2d at 367.
115. See Langley v. Danco Constr. Co., 57 Ark. App. 295, 944 S.W.2d 142 (1997).
116. Cox v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. E408120, slip op. at 6 (Workers' Comp.
Comm'n Aug. 14, 1995). The Commission also noted, from its review of THE MERCK
MANUAL (Robert Berkow ed., 15th ed. 1987), that carpal tunnel syndrome symptoms and
diagnostic findings can be associated with diabetes.
117. No. E513055 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n Aug. 14, 1996).
118. Herrera, slip op. at 7.
119. McDaniels v. Michael D. McDaniels, D.D.S., No. E600713, slip op. at 7 (Workers'
Comp. Comm'n Sept. 9, 1997).
120. See id., slip op. at 2.
121. Seeid., slip op. at3-4.
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causing nerve root compression in the claimant's cervical spine, and not
the claimant's work related activity as the claimant asserts. In reaching our
decision we note that diagnostic testing revealed similar degenerative
osteophyte abnormalities in both the left and the right side of the claimant's
spine. Consequently, we find that the greater weight of the credible
evidence establishes that the formation of these degenerative abnormalities
is not related to the claimant's right side posturing or to any other aspect
of his employment as a dentist.122
The foregoing comments illustrate the precision that a causal connection
analysis can involve, whether "ordinary" or "major." Presumably, the outcome
might have been different had the claimant's cervical degeneration been limited
to his right side, from which he evidently postured while performing dental
services. On the other hand, in light of the General Assembly's precise
definition of "major cause," it should come as no surprise when the claims it
affects turn on subtle factors.
I. REQUIREMENTS COMMON To ALL INJURIES
In addition to the requirements previously discussed, Arkansas Code
section 11-9-102(5) contains a number of others that are generally common to
all injuries. To begin with, a compensable injury must "arise out of and in the
course of employment. ' ' Also, a compensable injury must cause an "internal
or external physical harm to the body,"1 24 require "medical services" or result
in "disability or death,"'' 2 5 and be established by "medical evidence supported
by 'objective findings."" 26 Finally, if a medical opinion is offered as evidence
of compensability, it must be stated "within a reasonable degree of medical
certainty."12 7 Of all the foregoing, the establishment of "objective findings"
tends to be the most challenging.
Act 796 defines "objective findings" as "those findings which cannot
come under the voluntary control of the patient."' 28 Previously, certain medical
findings which were arguably subject to patient influence had been accepted
as objective, such as those based on range of motion.129 However, following
122. Id., slip op. at 5 (emphasis in original).
123. ARK. CODE ANN. §1 1-9-102(5)(A)(i) (Michie Repl. 1996).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-102(5)(D) & (16)(A)(i) (Michie Repl. 1996).
127. ARK. CODE ANN. §1 1-9-102(16)(B) (Michie Repl. 1996).
128. ARK. CODE ANN. §1 I-9-102(16)(A)(i) (Michie Repl. 1996).
129. See Taco Bell v. Finley, 38 Ark. App. 11, 826 S.W.2d 313 (1992). Similar exams,
such as the "Phalens" (an effort to manipulate the median nerve into reproducing carpal tunnel




the implementation of Act 796, any finding based on a "patient's description
of the sensations produced by various stimuli" will not qualify as objec-
tive--even if the examination which produced the findings was capable of
detecting malingering or false responses.130 Put another way, "complaints of
pain are not objective. Likewise, complaints of tenderness or positive range of
motion tests are not objective."''
Even so, there remains a wide variety of medical findings which may be
considered objective. Almost any visible or palpable evidence of injury will
suffice, as long as it is related to the asserted compensable injury. For instance,
muscle spasms and fluid build-up are both acceptable objective findings.'
Moreover, muscle spasms can be "seen" as well as palpated, since radiographic
diagnostics can reveal a straightening of the spine associated with muscular
contraction. 33 In claims involving carpal tunnel syndrome, positive results
from electrodiagnostic nerve tests are the most reliable objective findings, 34
and even relatively subtle findings, such as a "5 cm by 5 cm fibrous mass," can
satisfy the requirement. 13 There are also more overt objective findings such as
a herniated disc.'
36
Recently, the Arkansas Court of Appeals has had occasion to consider the
overall scope of the objective findings requirement. In Stephens Truck Lines
v. Millican,13 respondents argued that the objective medical evidence did
reveal an injury, but failed to prove "that the injury took place on July 26,
1994, or that appellee injured his neck while working for appellant."'' 3 The
respondents should have argued that the objective findings simply bore no
causal relationship to the claimant's asserted compensable injury. Framed as
it was, however, the Court declined to accept respondents' position:
Reeder v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 38 Ark. App. 248, 832 S.W.2d 505 (1992).
130. See Duke v. Regis Hairstyles, 55 Ark. App. 327, 935 S.W.2d 600 (1996).
131. Todd v. Phillips Electronics Co., No. E60241 1, slip op. at 5 (Workers' Comp.
Comm'n Aug. 13, 1997).
132. See, e.g., Norvell v. J-Mar Express, Inc., No. E402198 (Workers' Comp. Conun'n
May 24, 1996); Sexton v. First Brands, No. E416667 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n Sept. 24,
.1996); University of Arkansas Med. Sciences v. Hart, 60 Ark. App. 13,958 S.W.2d 546 (1997).
133. See Risner v. J.C. Penney Constr. Co., No. E513459, slip op. at 3 (Workers' Comp.
Comm'n Aug. 20, 1997).
134. See generally Sexton, No. E416667, slip op. at 4-5.
135. See generally Daniel v. Firestone Bldg. Prods., 57 Ark. App. 123, 125, 942 S.W.2d
277, 278 (1997); Dugan v. Jerry Sweetster, Inc., 54 Ark. App. 401, 928 S.W.2d 341 (1996).
136. See, e.g., Watson v. Stillmeadow Nursing Home, No. E513037 (Workers' Comp.
Comm'n Jan. 6, 1997).
137. 58 Ark. App. 275, 950 S.W.2d 472 (1997).
138. Stephens, 58 Ark. App. at 279, 950 S.W.2d at 474.
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Appellant, in effect, asks us to apply the statutorily-mandated standard of
strict construction to hold that a claimant must offer objective medical
evidence to prove not only the existence of an injury, but also to show the
circumstances under which the injury was sustained and the precise time
of the injury's occurrence. This we cannot do .... We know of no type of
medical examination or test that would result in objective findings to show
exactly where and when an injury was incurred, or whether the employee
was injured while performing employment services rather than while
engaging in horseplay .... Consequently, we hold the requirement that a
compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by
objective findings applies only to the existence and extent of the injury."'
Previously, in Adams v. Swift Eckrich, Inc.,'" the Commission had
determined that the objective findings requirement applied to the question of
initial compensability, "and not collateral issues."'4 1 Adams itself relied on the
Commission's prior decision in Graham v. Chamber Door Industries, Inc.,142
which held that the duration of a given claimant's "healing period" did not
depend on objective findings:
Respondents insist that some objective medical evidence of injury is a
necessary prerequisite to an award of temporary total disability in this case.
We do not agree with this assertion. Instead, we note that the critical
question is whether a claimant's healing period has "stabilized." While the
presence of objective findings, or lack thereof, may be a factor in an
analysis of this question, it is not detenninative. 14
Generally, once the question of objective findings is resolved in a
particular claim, so too is the issue of whether the injury has been established
with "medical evidence." Medical evidence devoid of objective findings will
be of little use for proving compensability, while the identification of objective
findings usually implies the existence of medical evidence as their source.44
In addition, the presence of an objective finding should be sufficient to prove
139. Id. at 279, 950 S.W.2d at 474-75.
140. No. E600098 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n May 7, 1997).
141. Adams, No. E600098, slip op. at4.
142. No. E400258 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n Jan. 9, 1997), aff'd, 59 Ark. App. 224, 956
S.W.2d 196 (1997).
143. Graham, slip op. at 4-5.
144. In the absence of specific documentation in an operative report, objective findings
cannot be inferred from the mere fact that a claimant underwent surgery for a particular injury.
See Jackson v. Department of Human Servs., No. E515842, slip op. at 6 (Workers' Comp.
Comm'n Sept. 5, 1997).
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the occurrence of an internal or external physical harm to the body.145 Thus,
the "physical harm" requirement does not often appear as an independent issue.
It is also necessary to show that a work-related injury required "medical
services" or resulted in "disability or death." Not surprisingly, this particular
requirement rarely provides cause for conflict. For instance, the fact that
"medical services" were required can usually be inferred from the presence of
medical documentation in the record,"4 while "disability" simply refers to a
reduction in a claimant's earning capacity as the result of a compensable
injury. 147 And though the battle may rage around the issue of causation, there
is generally little dispute over the fact of a given claimant's death.
With regard to medical opinions, Act 796 does not specifically require
them as a prerequisite to compensability. Instead, it is only necessary that if a
medical opinion is introduced, it be stated in reasonably certain terms. 148 Such
certainty was not required prior to Act 796, so long as an asserted causal
relationship could be supported by supplemental evidence.
49
Because medical opinions are not a necessity for proving a compensable
injury, the issue of reasonable medical certainty is somewhat secondary to this
discussion. However, one should be aware that certain words in a physician's
statement can cast doubt on the strength of the opinion offerred. As an
example, the Full Commission has held that the phrase "I suspect" does not
amount, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.' 50 Terms such as
"possibly" or "maybe" are equally questionable, but "probably" should
suffice. 5'
Finally, the requirement that a compensable injury "arise out of and in the
course of employment" is perhaps the most fundamental aspect of workers'
compensation law. As a first principle, this concept pre-dates Act 796 of 1993,
and has been judicially explained as follows:
A claimant before the Workers' Compensation Commission must prove
that the injury sustained was the result of an accident arising out of and in
the course of employment. The phrase "arising out of the employment"
refers to the origin or cause of the accident and the phrase "in the course
145. See Norvell, No. E402198, slip op. at 6, 8.
146. See Watkins v. Stax, No. E416219, slip op. at 6 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n May 6,
1997).
147. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(9) (Michie Repl. 1996).
148. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(16)(B) (Michie Repl. 1996).
149. See Hope Brick Works v. Welch, 33 Ark. App. 103, 802 S.W.2d 476 (1991).
150. See Ward v. TCS, Inc./SAJ Distrib., No. E500617, slip op. at 7 (Workers' Comp.
Comm'n Oct. 31, 1996), aff'd, No. CA 97-243 (Sept. 24, 1997) (not designated for publication).
151. See Peridore v. Childress Gin Co., No. E504068, slip op. at 2, 6 (Workers' Comp.
Comm'n Nov. 14, 1996). Peridore involved the issue of "reasonably necessary medical
treatment," but should be applicable to claims involving initial compensability.
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of employment" refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which
the injury occurred. Bass v. Mecklenburg County, 258 N.C. 226, 128
S.E.2d 570. In order for an injury to arise out of the employment, it must
be a natural and probable consequence or incident of the employment and
a natural result of one of its risks.
5 2
This basic approach to injury/employment causation remains essentially
intact in the wake of Act 796 and, as a general rule, the case law associated
with it still governs.
153
IV. "COMPENSABLE INJURY DOES NOT INCLUDE..."
Though not the focus of this discussion, Arkansas Code section 11-9-
102(5)(B)(i)-(iv) goes to considerable lengths to define what a "compensable
injury" is not. Specifically, subsection (B)(i) denies compensation for injuries
sustained by "any active participant in assaults or combats which ... are the
result of nonemployment-related hostility or animus of one, both, or all of the
combatants," and likewise excludes injuries stemming from "horseplay" unless
the injured party was an "innocent bystander."' 5 4 Subsection (B)(ii) rules out
injuries resulting from "any recreational or social activities for the employee's
personal pleasure,"'55 and is slightly redundant in light of the more commonly
asserted "employment services" defense found at Arkansas Code section 11-9-
102(5)(B)(iii)1 56 Briefly stated, "employment services" are those activities
which carry out an employer's purpose or advance an employer's interests, and
can take the form of either the employee's "primary activity" or "incidental
activities which are inherently necessary for the performance of the primary
152. J & G Cabinets v. Hennington, 269 Ark. 789, 600 S.W.2d 916 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980).
153. This is not, however, universally true. For example, in light of the "employment
services" defense found at ARK. CODE ANN. §I 1-9-102(5)(B)(iii) (Michie Repl. 1996), the
Arkansas Court of Appeals has held that the "premises exception" to the "going and coming
rule" is no longer available. See Hightower v. Newark Pub. Sch. Sys., 57 Ark. App. 159, 943
S.W.2d 608 (1997). As a general caveat, any potential interplay between the "employment
services" defense and the "arising out of and in the course of employment" requirement should
always be considered.
154. ARK. CODE ANN. § 1 1-9- 102(5)(B)(i) (Michie Repl. 1996).
155. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9- 102(5)(B)(ii) (Michie Repl. 1996).
156. This section states that a compensable injury does not include any "[i]njury which was
inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed, or
before the employee was hired or after the employment relationship was terminated." ARK.
CODE ANN. § 1i-9- 102(5)(B)(iii) (Michie Repl. 1996).
[Vol. 20
"COMPENSABLE INJURY"
activity." ' As a general rule, an employee who is not performing employment
services at the time of injury will be ineligible for compensation.'
One of the most dramatic changes wrought by Act 796 relates to injuries
which are "substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol, illegal drugs, or
prescription drugs used in contravention of a physician's orders."1 59 That
compensation is denied for such injuries is not surprising, for the same rule
applied before Act 796 went into effect.' 6 However, prior to the Act, there
was a statutory presumption that an injury did not result from intoxication. 61
Arkansas Code section 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv)(b) completely reverses this
approach:
The presence of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in
contravention of a physician's orders shall create a rebuttable presumption
that the injury or accident was substantially occasioned by the use of
alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of a
physician's orders.
62
The statute further provides that "[e]very employee is deemed by his
performance of services to have impliedly consented to reasonable and
responsible testing by properly trained medical or law enforcement personnel
... .,,1563 Under the rule currently followed by the Commission, a failure to
submit to such testing will itself give rise to the presumption in subsection(B3)(iv)(b). '64
157. Pettey v. Olsten Kimberly Quality Care, No. E405037, slip op. at 4 (Workers' Comp.
Comm'n Sept. 13, 1995), aff'd, 55 Ark. App. 343, 934 S.W.2d 956 (1996) and aff'd, 328 Ark.
381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997). In Pettey, the claimant traveled to various patients' homes to
provide in-home nursing services and sustained an injury en route. See id., slip op. at 2. In
affirming the Commission, the Arkansas Court of Appeals commented that: "Whatever
'performing employment services' may mean in the context of ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-
102(5)(B)(iii), it must include the performance of those functions which are essential to the
success of the enterprise in which the employer is engaged." Olston Kimberly Quality Care v.
Pettey, 55 Ark. App. 343, 346, 934 S.W.2d 956, 958 (1996), aff'd 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d
524 (1997).
158. This may seem redundant given the broader requirement that compensable injuries
"arise out of and in the course of employment." However, the mission of the employment
services exclusion is to close some of the gaps left by the traditional rule. See supra note 153.
159. ARK. CODE ANN. §1 1-9-102(5)(B)(iv)(a) (Michie Repl. 1996).
160. See ARK. CODE ANN. §1 1-9-401(a)(2) (Michie 1987) (amended 1993).
161. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-707(4) (Michie 1987) (repealed 1993).
162. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv)(b) (emphasis added).
163. ARK. CODE ANN. §1 l-9-102(5)(B)(iv)(c) (Michie Repl. 1996).





Over the last few years, most of the questions surrounding Arkansas Code
section 11-9-102(5) have been answered. However, the statute is relatively
young and there is a virtually unlimited supply of factual variations yet to be
seen. Therefore, the subject of this discussion has not reached a static point,
as the evolving approach to "rapid repetitive motion" illustrates. In addition,
the possibility of legislative "fine-tuning" can never be ruled out. For now, Act
796 of 1993 remains a brave new world to some and a wasteland to others.
Such polarity of opinion suggests that no status quo is particularly safe.'65
165. Indeed, decisions rendered by the Full Commission are often appealed, and those cited
herein are no exception. The reader is cautioned that, to the author's knowledge, Mullins, No.
E600667 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n Mar. 13, 1997); Barnette, No. E603971 (Workers' Comp.
Comm'n Aug. 13, 1997); Henderson, No. E603760 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n Aug. 20, 1997);
Boyd, No. E604907 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n Sept. 26, 1997); Williford, No. E510333
(Workers' Comp. Comm'n Sept. 23, 1997); McDaniels, No. E600713 (Workers' Comp.
Comm'n Sept. 9, 1997); and Risner No. E513459 (Workers' Comp. Comm'n Aug. 20, 1997)
are all currently pending before the Arkansas Court of Appeals. While Mullins, Barnette,
Henderson, and Boyd have only been cited as indications of trends or for their dicta, the
remaining cases bear close watching. Most importantly, the Arkansas Court of Appeals'
decision in Kildow, 58 Ark. App. 194, 948 S.W.2d 867, is now before the Arkansas Supreme
Court, as is Kuligowski, 59 Ark. App. 261, 957 S.W.2d 715.
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